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Critical thinking and the disciplines reconsidered
Martin Davies*
Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia
This paper argues that Moore’s speciﬁst defence of critical thinking as ‘diverse
modes of thought in the disciplines’, which appeared in Higher Education
Research & Development, 30(3), 2011, is ﬂawed as it entrenches relativist
attitudes toward the important skill of critical thinking. The paper outlines the
critical thinking debate, distinguishes between ‘top-down’, ‘bottom-up’ and
‘relativist’ approaches and locates Moore’s account therein. It uses examples
from one discipline-speciﬁc area, namely, the discipline of Literature, to show
that the generalist approach to critical thinking does not ‘leave something out’
and outlines why teaching ‘generic’ critical thinking skills is central to tertiary
education, teaching and learning, and employment opportunities for students.
The paper also defends the assessment of critical thinking skills.
Keywords: critical thinking; generalist; speciﬁst
There may not be prayers in public schools, but by G_d generic skills will be taught in
universities!
(My Granny, with apologies to J.A. Fodor)
Introduction
Graduate attributes have been a topic in higher education since massiﬁcation of edu-
cation, and consequent public-sector investment, brought a requirement for accountabil-
ity. Recently, graduate attributes have resurfaced in the relationship between higher
education and employability. Employers emphasise the importance of producing gradu-
ates who have ‘generic skills’. A survey of 127 employers by Graduate Careers Australia
indicates how important generic skills have become.A number of employer-desired skills
were not ‘content’ or discipline-based at all, but generic. Employers rated interpersonal
communication skills (written, oral, listening) well above ‘qualiﬁcations’ and ‘previous
employment’ as the most important selection criteria when hiring graduates (57.5, 35.4
and 27.6%, respectively). Employers ranked ‘the least desirable characteristics’ to be
lack of communication skills at ﬁrst place in a list of 10 characteristics (40.2%). Poor aca-
demic qualiﬁcations were ranked ﬁfth (15%). ‘Critical thinking’ skills, as well as ‘Team-
work’ and ‘Leadership’ skills are also typically rated higher by employers than academic
qualiﬁcations (Graduate Outlook, 2006).
Higher education is, more than ever before, a means to employment. But qualiﬁca-
tions and content knowledge is not enough. Birrell and Healy’s (2008) survey compar-
ing the employment outcomes of local graduates and graduates from non-English-
speaking backgrounds found sharp differences in employment success. Only 16% of
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Chinese national graduates from Australian universities obtained employment in Aus-
tralia, compared to better employment outcomes for native English-speaking local stu-
dents (Maley, 2008). Employers, it appears, are ‘shunning’ some graduates. Of 120,000
students, only 61%of international students secured full-timework (compared to 87%of
domestic students). Some ethnic groups, for example mainland Chinese, do particularly
badly, with only 49% obtaining work within four months of graduation (Ross, 2009).
Competence in generic skills makes a difference to employment outcomes. Generic
skills need to be part of the curriculum. Potential employees graduating from university
need to have adequate literacy, numeracy and interpersonal skills, along with skills in
‘critical thinking’, ‘teamwork’ and ‘leadership’. These are required in addition to any
speciﬁc technical or content-related skills gained from study of the disciplines.
The critical thinking debate
The attribute of critical thinking has long been subject to a debate between the ‘general-
ists’ and the ‘speciﬁsts’. The generalist view is that the skill of critical thinking is in
large part (if not wholly) non-discipline-speciﬁc. That is, there is something about criti-
cal thinking that is general to all discipline areas. This implies that critical thinking is
teachable independently of the disciplines, by using various approaches, for example,
dedicated classes on informal logic or techniques of argument diagramming. The gen-
eralists do not hold that there are no discipline-speciﬁc differences in application of
arguments or in the language used to describe academic debates. They hold that the
skill is generic in nature. A major proponent of the generalist view, Robert Ennis
(1989), describes it as an approach that ‘attempts to teach critical thinking abilities
and dispositions separately from the presentation of the content of existing subject-
matter offerings’ (p. 4). For a comprehensive list of abilities and dispositions, see
Ennis (1987). The speciﬁst view, by contrast, is that critical thinking is discipline-
speciﬁc. It can only be correctly taught from a disciplinary vantage point and by
using the language of the disciplines. According to a major proponent of the speciﬁst
view, John McPeck (1981), ‘Thinking, by deﬁnition, is always thinking about some-
thing, and that something can never be “everything in general” but must be something
in particular’ (p. 4).
The dispute is characterised by Tim Moore in two ways:
[The key issue is] whether critical thinking should be thought of as some universal,
abstract category, or whether it is really just a ‘catch all’ term that takes in a wide and dis-
parate variety of modes of thinking. (2011a, p. 262)
Central [to the debate about graduate attributes] is the issue of whether critical thinking is
in fact a universal ‘generic skill’ able to be applied invariably to the situation at hand, or
whether it is best conceived as only a loose category taking in diverse modes of thought.
(2004, p. 4)
This issue would perhaps be of little concern to anyone except higher education aca-
demics if it did not have implications for teaching and learning policy-making. For
example, Moore criticises the Graduate Skills Assessment test on the grounds that it
assumes a generalist view of critical thinking (assessing relationships between prop-
ositions and statements) and does not allow for ‘nuanced judgements characteristic of
discipline-based texts’ (Moore, 2004, p. 15). He claims that there is a bifurcation
between the two camps (generalist and speciﬁst) resulting in complexities in educational
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decision-making in relation to ‘draw[ing] together in some intelligent way the homogen-
eity of the general with the pluralities of the particular’ (p. 14). There is also, he claims, a
failure to recognise a ‘relativism’ in higher education, where students appear to ‘nego-
tiate a wide range of subjects and associatedmodes of thought [without much difﬁculty]’
(p. 14), whilst, at the same time, ‘hardline’ positions on generic attributes such as critical
thinking are being promulgated as being vitally important for skill-building.
Moore’s (2004, 2011a) contributions to this topic consist of a dilemma casting
doubt on the generalist position. His central argument in both papers can be displayed
as an argument map, with his contention, or conclusion, in the top box, and reasons
for the contention in the linked boxes. The visual representation in Figure 1 makes it
easier to understand the argument, uncluttered by surrounding text, and is a tool in
use among critical thinking generalists. The argument below is equivalent to the
two formulations of his position above. (NB: Argument maps are read from the pre-
mises at the bottom to the contention at the top, and evidential grounds or ‘bases’ are
provided for each premise. Argument maps are normally in colour: green indicates
reasons, red indicates objections, and orange indicates rebuttals to objections.) We
shall deal with Moore’s bases for his premises in what follows.
Recently, Moore appears to have changed his position from his earlier paper that
sees the universal, generalist view as ‘mistaken’, though ‘a valid one for our students
to learn about’ (2004, p. 13). His new position is that the generalist view has ‘limit-
ations’ and that ‘a more useful conception of critical thinking is as a form of “metacri-
tique” – where the essential quality to be encouraged in students is a ﬂexibility of
thought, and the ability to negotiate a range of different critical modes’ (2011a, p. 262).
Is the generalist view ‘mistaken’ or does it have ‘limitations’? A difference in view,
certainly, but in any event, Moore opposes the generalist account and sides with the
speciﬁst alternative. Each premise of the argument will be taken in turn.
Figure 1. Moore’s argument.
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Critical thinking is not a universal abstract category
Moore’s (2011a) evidence for critical thinking not being a universal category is data
from interviews with ‘about six’ academics from each of the following disciplines: Phil-
osophy, History and Literary/Cultural Studies (p. 264). Such a small sample size hardly
constitutes compelling data as Moore himself admits (p. 263) but, leaving this aside,
what does the data demonstrate? In the samples cited, academics surveyed seem to
think that critical thinking is differently constituted in their respective disciplines.
He provides a number of examples (for additional examples, see Moore, 2011a,
pp. 265–267):
In explaining what being critical is, I say to my students ‘if someone is talking to you and
they’re saying this is my argument. And what they give you is not an argument, you
should be able to pull them up and say that was not an argument. What you’ve given
doesn’t support the conclusion’. (Philosophy informant#2)
[Being critical in History] is concerned… with the sources and the way in which you use
them. It’s building on the sources, or organising them in a particular way to construct a
particular … picture of the past. (History informant#2)
… we are less obviously critical about the texts we study. In selecting them for a course,
we have in a sense given them the beneﬁt of the doubt. I’m never totally uncritical, but if
I’m teaching a Shakespearean play, we’re not going to say ‘Shakespeare was a deﬁcient
playwright, wasn’t he’. Instead the questions we ask [are]: why do such texts have value
as literature, and how does this value come through? (Literary studies informant#2)
He takes these divergences of view to be more than unsupported opinions by a small
number of discipline-based experts. He takes them to constitute revealing metaphors
that demonstrate something important about the nature of critical thinking. The ﬁrst
(philosophical approach) he notes is concerned with rational evaluation. The second
(historical) approach is concerned with constructing narratives. The third (literary)
approach is concerned with textual interpretation. These different metaphors (evalua-
tive, constructive, interpretive) are thought to be differences in the nature of critical
thinking. The ﬁrst is logico-semantic in nature, the second is creative, the third,
exploratory and interrogative. Critical thinking is not a ‘universal category’ he con-
cludes, but displays ‘diverse modes of thought’ and should be considered speciﬁc to
the disciplines (Moore, 2004, 2011a).
Note that this position derives from assessment, by the investigator, of a small per-
spectival data set. It is the investigator’s attitude of what seems to be the case, from how
things seem to be to the participants.
Moore explains why this misunderstanding about the nature of critical thinking has
occurred. Discussions about critical thinking have been held in a ‘“vitrinous” realm,
detached from the domains in which critical thinking actually needs to be applied’
and, quoting Atkinson (1997, p. 74), has not been ‘rooted in any actual educational
reality’ (Moore, 2011a, p. 264). The examples used purport to indicate dissimilarities
between different kinds of critical thinking. Elsewhere he discusses three different
‘dimensions’ of critical thinking (Moore, 2004, pp. 8–11). However, in his most
recent paper, he uses vaguer language, and refers to ‘conﬁguration[s] of critical
elements’, a ‘multiplicity of practices’, a range of ‘heuristics’, ‘family resemblances’,
‘discursive modes’ and ‘distinctive critical modes’ (Moore, 2011b, pp. 14, 16, 17, 19).
Regardless of whether these differences are regarded as ‘dimensions’ or in the other
ways indicated, his claim is that these differences amount to a rejection of the generalist
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view. The disciplinary variations do not easily transfer in terms of each other. They
have different levels of complexity (logico-semantic, creative, exploratory and inter-
rogative). They are also difﬁcult to deﬁne in terms of each other. Adopting an explicitly
Wittgensteinian approach, he claims that, as with different senses of the term ‘game’
(card games, ball games, Olympic games): ‘it may be folly to imagine that there is a
single core of meaning for the term [“critical thinking”] which in turn is reducible to
a deﬁned set of cognitive operations’ … and that, therefore, the term refers to ‘a
multiplicity of practices, ones that are rooted in the quite individual nature of different
disciplinary language (and thinking) games’ (Moore, 2011a, p. 271). Teaching students
how to negotiate these different critical ‘modes’ by teaching ‘ﬂexibility’ via a form of
‘metacritque’ is needed (2011a, p. 262).
Does this Wittgensteinian-style conclusion follow from Moore’s examples?
This is hard to establish as Moore does not make his argument explicit enough to
easily criticise. Instead, Moore uses suggestive discipline-based examples and relies
on the reader to be convinced by the general position. But, let us try to reconstruct
the argument and look at a parallel example for comparison. The argument appears
to be this:
(1) Instances of critical thinking in the disciplines (logico-semantic, creative,
exploratory) are hard to deﬁne, have different levels of complexity and don’t
transfer easily from one context to another (without loss of discipline-speciﬁc
modes of thought).
(2) This raises doubts about what the generic term ‘critical thinking’ refers to and
how much commonality there is in how critical thinking is used in the
disciplines.
(3) Therefore, critical thinking is not a universal, abstract concept.
(4) Therefore, critical thinking is a discipline-speciﬁc concept.
An argument with an identical form – another technique beloved of generalists – brings
out the logical move:
(1) Printer fonts in documents (helvetica, roman, gothic) are hard to deﬁne, have
different levels of complexity and don’t transfer easily from one document to
another (without loss of formatting).
(2) This raises doubts about what the generic term ‘fonts’ refers to and how much
commonality there is in how fonts are used in documents.
(3) Therefore ‘font’ is not a universal, abstract concept.
(4) Therefore ‘font’ is a document-speciﬁc concept.
There is something wrong with this argument. The notion of a ‘font’ (critical thinking)
does seem to be a useful universal concept in spite of the objection. We know in general
what ‘font’ refers to, we don’t have problems applying the notion of ‘font’ to new
instances, we know one when we see one, and so on. The universal term ‘font’ is
descriptive of various instances of fonts. While one font (form of critical thinking) is
certainly not the same as another font, it is also true that the conceptual category
‘font’ captures commonalities between different font types. The same is true, of
course, with critical thinking.
It is on the strength of this reasoning, however, that Moore rejects critical thinking
as a generic skill and locates it within the ‘diverse modes of thought’ of the disciplines
Higher Education Research & Development 533
requiring ‘ﬂexibility of thought’, ‘distinctive critical modes’, ‘different heuristics’ and
‘metacritique’. This allows him to concur with McPeck (1981) that:
Thinking, by deﬁnition, is always thinking about something, and that something can never
be ‘everything in general’ but must be something in particular. (p. 4)
Compare:
Printing, by deﬁnition, is always printing something, and that something can never be
‘everything in general’ but must be something in particular.
In one sense, this statement seems trivially true. On a narrow reading, critical thinking is
transitive. (One can’t critically think without an object to think about.) This seems to
make the statement immediately compelling. But the statement claims something
more substantial. On a wider reading, the entire enterprise of critical thinking as a
generic skill is being questioned. It is on the basis of this, and the argument earlier,
that we are supposed to accept the idea that critical thinking should be seen in terms
of discipline-speciﬁc ‘modes of thought’, and be sceptical of critical thinking assess-
ment tests.
Critical thinking is either a universal category or a ‘catch all’ term
Moore simply asserts, without argument, the following ‘dilemma’ (from which we are
invited to choose one ‘horn’): critical thinking is either a universal, abstract category or
a ‘catch all’ term taking in a wide variety of modes of thinking in the disciplines. As is
clear from the preceding discussion, he means more than the term ‘critical thinking’, he
means its nature (i.e., the skill) as well. However, this is tantamount to being an
ungrounded premise, that is, an unsupported assertion, a false dichotomy involving
the fallacy of the false alternative (Quinn, 1994).
We don’t have to accept this assertion. It is reasonable to accept that the generic
critical thinking is fundamental at certain levels whilst accommodating discipline-
speciﬁc critical thinking discourse higher up. This is sometimes called the ‘infusionist’
position. This is the view of others (Ikuenobe, 2001). Figure 2 outlines this view.
The shade indicates the priority of dependence of universal generic skills (the
Figure 2. The infusionist position.
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logico-semantic) lower down on the infusionist view, and the relative independence –
though not completely – of critical thinking discourse (narratives, characterisation, etc.)
higher up (see Ikuenobe, 2001, for an outline of the various stages).
Exactly where the generic, universal form of critical thinking and the narrative dis-
cipline-speciﬁc instances of critical thinking discourse meet and diverge is open for
conjecture. Perhaps, in the scheme of things, this is unimportant. The important
thing is an acknowledgement that Moore’s dilemma is not a dilemma at all and that
no horn needs to be chosen. His view, by contrast, is that the generalist position is ‘mis-
taken’ or ‘misleading’, and that (Atkinson, 1997, p. 74) it is ‘desiderative and polem-
ical’ in nature (Moore, 2011a, p. 264).
Does critical thinking as a general skill leave something out?
There is more at stake here than the nature of ‘critical thinking’. Moore wants to suggest
that one reason why the generic view of critical thinking is wrong is that it does not
explain diverse critical facets of the disciplines mentioned earlier (evaluative, construc-
tive, interpretive). According to Moore (2011a), the evaluative ‘philosophical’ mode is
not primary at all, though, he adds – perhaps in a spirit of conciliation: ‘there is unlikely
to be any harm for students participating in general thinking programs’ (p. 263). His
position, however, is that the generalist view is ‘probably misplaced’ (p. 263) and
that other considerations need to be included in an all-encompassing discipline-
based, ‘relativistic’, discourse-enabled view of the nature of critical thinking. This is
akin to the top-down view and not the bottom-up view, as illustrated in Figure 3.
I have drawn these as triangles with a foundational base, as the general skill of criti-
cal thinking undergirds, I assume, disciplinary variations higher up. But the apex of the
triangles should really be hydra-headed, with a ‘point’ for every discipline, that is,
‘/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/’. To describe Moore’s (2011a) position as ‘top-down’ is being too gener-
ous, however. Moore makes it clear that he wants to make the slide into relativism:
‘one would hesitate to privilege any particular mode [of critical discourse] over any
other’ (p. 17). Elsewhere he cites approvingly Barnett’s ‘increasingly sophisticated
relativism’ (Barnett, 2000, p. 122; see also Moore, 2004, p. 14; 2011a, p. 272). In
fact, his position is more like that illustrated in Figure 4, with no precedence of any
Figure 3. The ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ positions.
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kind between generic critical thinking skills and the ‘modes of discourses’ in the
disciplines.
What is the nature of the disagreement between the top-down view and the bottom-
up view? Is this move to relativism justiﬁed? Moore’s claim is that critical thinking qua
universal/generalist category (call this CT1) does not explain the ‘diverse modes of
thought’ in the disciplines (call this CT2). I claim that it does. However, importantly,
I do not claim that CT1 explains away these different modes of thought. Indeed, the
‘infusion’ approach outlined earlier is a statement of the obvious: at one level critical
thinking consists of inferential connections, logical relationships and so on (CT1), at
another it expresses discipline-relevant relationships – persuasiveness, narratives, char-
acter descriptions, and so on (CT2) (Davies, 2006). Critical thinking skills are princi-
pally generic, though this does not rule out other ways in which one can interpret
the word ‘critical’. The term ‘critical thinking’ is notoriously ill-deﬁned. In this –
and only this – Moore and I agree.
However, I go further and claim that the generic sense of critical thinking (CT1)
explains, without residue, any other supervenient sense of critical thinking (CT2).
This is the bottom-up view. Moore does not accept this, and plumps for ‘modes of dis-
course’ and an unwillingness to accept one mode having priority over another. This
results in the relativist view. Top-downism, for Moore at least, thus slips naturally
into relativism.
I have argued against top-downism elsewhere (Davies, 2006), but – as the issue
keeps coming back (this time as a hardened form of relativism) – there is need for
another line of response – but ﬁrst a caveat.
Explaining and explaining away
Explaining something without residue is not the same as explaining something away.
To make this clear, let’s consider the phenomenon of the sunrise. You and I both
talk about the sun rising and falling or ‘setting’. You and I both know that this is non-
sense. The sun does not rise and fall at all (more correctly, the earth sinks). However, it
seems to us as though it does. Indeed, try as we might, it is hard to talk correctly about
the astronomical event in its proper terms. It is hard to even see the sun rise as – what is
in fact – an earth sink, in its proper terms. ‘Sun rising and setting’ has become, in
common parlance – and visually – an ineradicable part of how we see and describe
Figure 4. The relativist position.
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this event, knowledge of the solar system notwithstanding. Philosophers refer to this
kind of talk as ‘folk psychology’: false, outmoded attitudes so embedded in our lives
that the scientiﬁc facts do not dislodge them. There is no dispute among us that the
earth moves in an ellipse around a stationary sun. Yet, we still talk and ‘see’ the
earth sink as a sun ‘rise’. The scientiﬁc facts – the correct scientiﬁc theory – explains
this astronomical event better and more accurately, yet it does not explain away the folk
psychological talk of sun rises and sunsets. This folk psychological talk remains: a false
theory – beloved by poets, artists, adults and children alike – despite our knowledge to
the contrary. There is no contradiction between something seeming to be true and the
same thing being false.
This can be applied to the critical thinking debate: critical thinking qua logical
relationships (CT1) explains critical thinking qua discipline-speciﬁcity (CT2)
without residue, but does not explain it away. We can still talk about the ‘diverse
modes of thought’ in the form of the language of the disciplines being different from
the logical relationships of universal/generic critical thinking (CT1). We can still talk
about the importance of character, narratives, persuasion and so on. The critical
language of disciplinary discourse has a harmless place in discussions on disciplinary
topics. But, like talk on sun-setting, this talk adds nothing substantive to the nature of
critical thinking. I argue later that this is an example of ‘folk psychology’ talk that can
result in poor educational decision-making.
Moore’s respondents appear to favour the top-down model. It seems to them (the
participants) that the critical concerns in their respective disciplines are unique and
qualitatively distinct: different disciplines have a different kind of critical thinking.
Given the nature of academic tribes, this is hardly surprising. Academics like to
think that their discipline has unique and privileged access to an epistemic discourse
space that others do not have. But does this seeming amount to much? After all, it
seems to us that the sun rises and falls. Is there any real substance to the idea that
the ‘modes of thought’ of the disciplines trumps critical thinking as a generic skill?
Let’s take a couple of examples to see if they do. We’ll look at some examples from
one of the disciplines cited in Moore’s survey, namely, the discipline of Literature,
in what follows, but the same could be done with text from any discipline, from
Astrophysics to Zoology.
Case 1: The insensitive son
A student of French is given the ﬁrst lines of Albert Camus’ novel L’Étranger to trans-
late into English. He or she reads the words:
Aujourd’hui, maman est morte. Ou peut-être hier, je ne sais pas.
A good student could possibly understand enough French to translate the passage, as
follows:
Today, my mother died. Or maybe it was the day before, I don’t know.
This translation expresses the linguistic meaning of the two sentences in French. At the
level of translation nothing appears to be missing. However, there is another meaning
being conveyed. Meursault, who speaks these lines is showing a disturbing insensitiv-
ity. He lacks what we might expect are the normal feelings of a person whose mother
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has just died. Meursault speaks of this event in the same way that one might remember
seeing something interesting on the TV, for example: ‘Today, I saw a documentary on
Camus’ life. Or maybe it was the day before, I don’t know’.
A very young person possibly would not have enough life experience to realise that
these two sentences are revealing about the character that speaks them. They may
understand the linguistic meaning of these sentences, but not what they are telling us
about Meursault’s character. They might fail to appreciate the different kind of
meaning that can be conveyed. This appears to be a clear example of what Moore
calls ‘the diverse modes of thought’ of the disciplines (in this case, Literature).
In the context of the critical thinking debate, the key question is this: does the dis-
cipline-speciﬁc ‘literary’ interpretation of the passage (CT2) capture something that the
‘generalist’ interpretation (CT1) does not?
Whatever the undeniable discipline-speciﬁc importance such information has for
literacy experts, I claim that the literary interpretation can be captured, without
residue, by critical thinking as a ‘universal’ generic category (CT1). I claim that
there is nothing critically substantive about the literary ‘mode of thinking’ that CT1
does not capture. By contrast, Moore seems to think it is unique; or, to use an old
fashioned term – a sui generis sense of critical thinking (CT2).
Camus, the writer, does not tell us that Meursault is insensitive. That’s for us to
work out: it is a logical inference on the part of the reader. The author expects us to
recognise these are not the thoughts of a devoted, loving son. We have to use the
clues that the author gives us, and for the adult reader this is not difﬁcult. His two sen-
tences communicate, simultaneously, both the thoughts of Meursault and information
about his personality. We can, however, easily map the reasoning that leads us to this
conclusion as in Figure 5.
The map in Figure 5 shows the author’s implicit contention of the passage in the top
box, and the tacit reasoning behind the ‘argument’ in the premise boxes below the con-
tention. Two implicit passages are joined as co-premises (as it seems reasonable, and
necessary, to hold both simultaneously). Another premise is represented by itself.
Both the co-premises, and the accompanying premise, provide support for the implicit
contention.
Figure 5. Camus’ insensitive son ‘argument’.
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On what evidence, literary or otherwise, are the premises based? We can directly
support the premise that Meursault does not express regret at his Mother’s death by
referring directly to the quoted passage (hence ‘quote’ is provided to ground one of
the premises). The co-premises have somewhat more amorphous, but no less legitimate,
support. They are based on what might be called ‘common belief’. These are the set of
(imprecise and often unstated) rules and principles that we, as humans, normally
acquire and carry with us from cradle to the grave.
The issue is this: does this mapped version of the meaning behind Camus’ passage
miss, or omit, any essential critical information? Is there anything in the passage that is
not in the argument map? I don’t think so. Does it fail to note that Meursault is unusual
in the sense that these are not the normal thoughts of a loving son? Clearly not. Does the
mapped version fail to tell us that Meursault is being insensitive? Again, no. Indeed,
this information is provided explicitly, making it easier to interpret Camus’ elliptical
passage.
Does the argument map lose some of the beauty and rawness of the language?
Perhaps. But then, the critical thinking debate is not about whether logical reasoning
is co-extensive with the written word. Neither Moore nor I are suggesting that literary
language (for example) and critical thinking are the same thing.The issue is whether criti-
cal thinking is best thought of in terms of the universal category of reasoning, or in terms
of the language of the disciplines. Moore’s approach is that critical thinking is speciﬁc to
themodes of thought as expressed in the language of the disciplines and that the universal
approach does not capture what the modes of thought (not the language) of the
disciplines can. But here we have an example of a mode of thought in Literature
which is perfectly well captured by the universalist approach, with no apparent residue.
I am not suggesting that the map of reasoning is a replacement or substitute for the
quoted passage from Camus. It explains what Camus is trying to tell us, but it does not
explain it away. Literature can, of course, be enjoyed on its own terms (e.g. as beautiful
language). Literature can also be ruined by over-analysis. There is also more to Litera-
ture than arguments. But is there something critically special about the literary language
in this example that is not captured by the argument map? Is there something unique
about the ‘mode of thinking’ of Literature that is inaccessible to the argumentative/phi-
losophical, mode? I think not.
Case 2: Hamlet is going before God
The works of Shakespeare have not often been taken to be examples of reasoning,
though they can:
It is appointed unto all men once to die. Thus it is that each of us must journey to that
borne from which no traveller returns. That is only the truth, rue it as we will. Yon
Prince Hamlet, the melancholy Dane, he who treated the fair Ophelia so discourteously
– and yet who is more to be pitied than censured – he, I say, though we know not
when, must surely in his turn shufﬂe off this mortal coil. So it must be, whether it is a
consummation devoutly to be wished or the most unkindest cut of all, for Hamlet is,
aye, every inch a man. He shall go before the face of almighty God, then, He who
gives and takes all life, for all who die, be they king or beggar, or Prince of Denmark,
must do so.
The ﬁrst thing to note about this celebrated passage is that it is an argument. It is
more than an assertion. It is also more than beautiful language. Something is being
Higher Education Research & Development 539
contended. What is contended is that Hamlet must go before God. Reasons are
provided for this contention. The whole argument can be charted as an argument
map (Figure 6).
Here we have an argument with an intermediate conclusion (‘Hamlet must die’) sup-
porting a ﬁnal conclusion (‘Hamlet must go before God’). The premises of this passage
can be supported either by data (there are no extant examples of men who do not die and
plenty of data on men who do), and common belief in the same, as well as common
(religious) belief – by some – (assertions by others) about where people go after
death. One claim is grounded in little more than assertion. That ‘Hamlet is a man’ is
given to us by ﬁat by Shakespeare, as well as our knowledge of the play.
Is there anything in terms of critical analysis (not analysis of the language) that is
missing from the passage? Ophelia is not mentioned, but she is hardly germane to the
argument being defended. That Hamlet is a Dane – and that he is melancholy – is
unmentioned, but this is also superﬂuous to the argument of the passage. Shakespeare
wishes to support the conclusion that Hamlet must go before God and he gives us
reasons for so believing. Other reﬁnements are incidental to this assessment. The
sheer poetry of the language is not captured, but this is not the aim of critical thinking.
Again, I submit that there is nothing in the ‘mode of thought’ expressed in this example
from Shakespeare’s Hamlet that is unavailable to critical scrutiny of the universalist/
generalist approach.
Speciﬁsts might claim that this kind of reading misses the point of what is required
in terms of a student undertaking a literary analysis of Shakespeare. But critical analy-
sis and literary analysis are not equivalent. The generalist approach to critical thinking
does not claim that the language of the disciplines is dispensable or redundant, only that
there is nothing in the discipline-speciﬁc nature of critical thinking that is not captured
by the generalist approach. By contrast, Moore is arguing that the generalist view is
Figure 6. Shakespeare’s Hamlet argument.
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‘mistaken’ and/or ‘misleading’ and needs to be supplanted with discipline-speciﬁc
meta-critique.
We have seen that Literature can be used as a means to deconstruct, assess and
discuss arguments. (As an aside, I think such argumentative rigour would not be a
bad addition to some subjects, e.g. Cultural/Literary Studies.) But I acknowledge
that this is not a substitute for the use of Literature for other purposes, for example,
the evaluation of the aesthetic quality of the works.
A conﬂation of issues
Moore’s position on critical thinking conﬂates a number of issues and deﬁnitions:
. Substantive theoretical issues: are universal/generic critical thinking skills the
foundation of critical thinking?
. Semantic issues: what does the term ‘critical thinking’ mean?
. Cultural issues: are there cultural differences in critical thinking?
. Normative issues: how should we teach critical thinking?
A number of deﬁnitions can also be distinguished:
. Lexical (descriptive) deﬁnitions: the different ways a term is used
. Precisive (explicative) deﬁnitions: restricting usage of a term so it is more precise
in some context
. Theoretical deﬁnitions: describing what a term ‘really’ means (i.e., a theoretical
understanding of it).
Moore moves from a lexical deﬁnition to a theoretical deﬁnition and thence to a nor-
mative conclusion. The core of his (2007 and 2011a) papers (and his 2011b book), is
the observation, based on a small number of interviews, that the (lexical) term ‘critical
thinking’ is used in different ways in different disciplines. The intermediate (theoreti-
cal) conclusion is that the universal/generic approach to critical thinking is mistaken.
The ﬁnal (normative) conclusion is that the generalist approach to critical thinking
should not be privileged.
However, it is fallacious to move from lexical premises to theoretical conclusions.
Compare:
P1: People in the United States talk about human rights in one way (lexical).
P2: People in China talk about them in another way (lexical).
P4: People in Saudia Arabia talk about them in another way (lexical).
IC: Therefore, the idea of universal/generic human rights is mistaken (theoretical).
C: Therefore, the generic conception of ‘human rights’ should not be privileged
(normative).1
Generalists know that the term ‘critical thinking’ is used in different ways in different
disciplines. Not much follows from that. The generalist’s account of critical thinking
cannot be challenged by pointing out that not everyone talks that way, just as the phy-
sicist’s deﬁnitions of ‘force’ or ‘heat’ cannot be challenged by pointing out that these
terms are used in different ways (e.g. in the kitchen/lab).
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Why is the generalist position important?
I began this paper by outlining the importance of generic skills for employment success.
What is the relevance of this to the critical thinking debate?
Recent work on critical thinking reminds us why the generic skill of argumentation
is important. Disturbingly, many students leave school ‘unable to understand, evaluate,
or write arguments’ (Larson, Britt, & Kurby, 2009, p. 340). One study, involving
57 native English-speaking students, found that, without a tutorial on the generic
skills of argumentation, college students ‘frequently failed to distinguish acceptable
arguments from structurally ﬂawed arguments’ (p. 358). ‘Acceptable arguments’
are ones in which a student can distinguish warranted from unwarranted arguments
(i.e., supported by a reason) and to distinguish those from assertions (without any
reasons at all):
(1a) People should be allowed to have only two biological children.
(1b) People should be allowed to have only two biological children because chil-
dren are small.
(1c) People should be allowed to have only two biological children because it
would help stabilize population growth.
College students could only identify warranted arguments (1c) from unwarranted argu-
ments (1b), from assertions (1a) with only 66% baseline accuracy.
Another recent study involving 76 native English-speaking tertiary students found
that students are ‘not skilled at identifying key elements of an argumentative text’ and
‘were not proﬁcient comprehenders of natural, written arguments’ (Larson, Britt, &
Larson, 2004, pp. 205, 220). Only 30% of all participants could identify and distinguish
between claims (assertions) and reasons in a text. Most selected reasons that could not
support the claims being made and mistakenly identiﬁed counter-claims as main claims.
Interestingly, when provided with explicit discourse markers such as therefore, hence,
thus and given a 10-minute tutorial on generic reasoning skills, they showed marginal
improvements.
Another ﬁve-year study on 2322 American college students reported that 45% of
students made no signiﬁcant improvement in their critical thinking skills during the
ﬁrst two years of college and 36% made no signiﬁcant improvement after an entire
four-year college degree (Arum & Roksa, 2011).
Dispiriting evidence about students’ lack of critical thinking skills is not news to
those working in universities. Lecturers routinely complain about the lack of critical
rigour in students’ work, their inability to cover more complex material in class
(owing to students’ marginal abilities in reading, understanding and satisfactorily pro-
cessing arguments) and the failure of many students to satisfactorily critique academic
arguments in writing tasks. Some of this can be attributed to the large numbers of inter-
national students in universities who struggle with English and who come from cultures
unused to the critical, argumentative culture of western universities. However, this does
not explain the poor performance of native English-speaking students in the exper-
iments just outlined. These results can only be explained by the failure of educators
to adequately impart critical thinking skills. One reason for this failure might be our
views as educators about the nature of critical thinking.
Moore’s relativist approach to critical thinking has real dangers. It fosters compla-
cency – nonchalance even – in regard to teaching critical thinking. If critical thinking is
to be understood as ‘diverse modes of thinking’ in the disciplines, no priority need be
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granted to generic skill development – for this is merely one ‘mode of thought’ among
many. The consequences of this are undesirable. When educationalists themselves are
swayed by the dead hand of relativism, it is unsurprising that little attention has been
given to teaching and assessing for these skills. This results in students lacking argu-
mentative skills to perform in universities and the workplace. Employers are right to
complain if graduates cannot think critically, educators are obliged to do something
about it. The need is urgent. A report on the attitudes of Australian employers claims
‘capacity for independent and critical thinking… sets apart successful from unsuccess-
ful applicants… but it is rare’ (Commonwealth of Australia, 2000, p. viii, emphasis in
original). Research shows that, without purposeful and dedicated intervention, students
achieve minimal improvement in their critical thinking skills over the duration of their
undergraduate degrees (Hitchcock, 2004). If this is true, it would seem, contra Moore,
that there is a very sound basis indeed for the introduction of assessment measures such
as the Graduate Skills Assessment test and, for that matter, any other well-validated test
of critical thinking.
Coda
The speciﬁst approach to critical thinking is dangerous and wrong-headed. Moore’s
(2004 and 2011a) papers neither support a rejection of the generalist thesis nor
provide compelling reasons to accept a relativist attitude to the concept of critical think-
ing. Transferable generic skills such as critical thinking may indeed be hard to isolate
and satisfactorily explain, but this is no reason to adopt the comforting illusions offered
by speciﬁsm and relativism.
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